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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis treats a case study of ethnic 
tension in Russia of the 21st century and the impact of this 
episode on Russian nationalism in the present.  As social, 
cultural and political issues have resurfaced between 
contemporary ethnic Russians and members of the Northern 
Caucasus-Chechen minority group, this centuries-old-ethnic-
conflict continues into the present in a battle over 
territorial integrity and national self-determination. After 
withstanding two “Chechen Wars” over the past decade, such 
chaotic events as a restaurant brawl on August 30th, 2006 
between Chechens and ethnic Russians continue to fuel 
ethnic, national, and religious dissension throughout the 
Post-Soviet Region. This development has fostered the 
organization of such groups as the “Movement Against Illegal 
Immigration.” 
Certain members of Russian society view the conflicts 
as driven by economic and political factors, while many 
government officials have refused to even label this crisis 
as an “ethnic conflict”.  Nonetheless, it can not be refuted 
that these ongoing tensions appear to be driven by violence 
with roots in the past—violence that can be traced back to 
Tsarist Rule.   Furthermore, the present struggle between 
ethnic Russians and their “Near-Abroad Others” (i.e., 
Chechens) has become fertile ground for ongoing scholarly 
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I. UNRESOLVED ETHNIC CONFLICT AND RELIGIOUS 
REVIVAL IN RUSSIA 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The fate of Russia in the past and present has been 
also the fate of its nationalities and their striving for 
self determination in an age of nationalism. Such a 
generalization adheres in the 21st century as it did a 
century ago. The present work examines one aspect of this 
phenomenon in detail in the hope of generalizing about the 
whole. Social tensions have given rise to conflict in the 
Karelian town of Kondopoga, Russia.  As social, cultural and 
political issues have resurfaced between contemporary ethnic 
Russians and members of the Northern Caucasus-Chechen 
minority group, this centuries old ethnic conflict now 
continues in a battle over territorial integrity and 
national self-determination.1 
After withstanding two “Chechen Wars” over the past 
decade, such chaotic events as a restaurant brawl on August 
30th, 2006 between Chechens and ethnic Russians continue to 
fuel ethnic, national, and religious dissension (i.e., 
between Chechen Separatist Rebels and Russian forces) 
throughout the Post-Soviet region. One result has been such 
organization as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration 
                     
1 Ben Fowkes, ed.  Russia and Chechnia: The Permanent Crisis (Great 
Britain: MacMillan Press, 1998), 90.  There are numerous sources 
documenting the history of Russian-Chechen relations such as Geoffrey 
Hosking’s Russia and the Russians: A History (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), chaps. 3, 4 and 5; Anatol 
Lieven’s Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998), chap. 9; and Paul J. Murphy’s The Wolves of 
Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror (Washington: Brassey’s 
Inc., 2004), 1. 
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(DPNI); a facet of the nationalistic uprising that has been 
a feature of the Putin regime.2  Such organizations seek to 
“protect the interests of Russia’s native population” while 
“cracking down” on the “Caucasus Mafia”.3 
Some members of Russian society view the conflicts as 
being driven by economic and political factors, while many 
government officials have refused to even label this crisis 
as an “ethnic conflict”.4  Nonetheless, it can not be 
refuted that the ongoing ethnic and religious tensions 
appear to be driven by historical violence—conflict that can 
be traced back to the days of Tsarist Rule.  This appearance 
is evident in how ethnic Russians and members of the 
minority group (i.e., Chechen Separatist Rebel forces) 
continue to seek the assertion of their respective ethnic 
(and religious) “superiority” and “righteousness”. 
Incidentally, the present struggle between ethnic 
Russians and their “Near-Abroad Others”5 (i.e., Chechens) 
remain as ongoing contributions to the scholarly works of 
ethnic conflict and radical religious revival.6  As 
President Putin seeks to “… restore Russia’s pride and 
prestige”, the former Soviet Republics are pursuing a less 
                     
2 “Brawl Erupts into Pogrom in Traditionally Tranquil North,” Moscow 
News, September 8, 2006, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil universe/document accessed 12 October 
2006. 
3 “Russia Cracks Down on Illegal Labor Migration,” The Moscow News, 
2006.  http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.hph?2006-46-1 accessed 4 
December 2007. 
4 “Economic, political factors seen at play in northern Russia ethnic 
riots,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 6, 2006, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil universe/document accessed 12 October 
2006. 
5 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.  
New York: Penguin, 2002, 194.   
6 Russia’s Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment.  
Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995,1.  
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pluralistic national identity based upon self-government and 
complete separation from “Mother Russia”.7  And while “major 
combat operations have ended in Chechnya … small-scale 
guerilla conflict is still going on between Russian forces 
and Chechen rebels”.8 
1. Purpose 
This thesis will analyze how the ethnic Russian search 
for a cohesive national identity affects its relations with 
neighboring countries (i.e., its former Russian Republics 
and members of the international community) via the 
employment of a case study analysis.  This thesis also seeks 
to analyze the foundations of the long standing ethnic and 
religious conflicts between Mother Russia and Chechnya.  In 
addition, it will also seek to uncover the interests of the 
parties involved (e.g., Russian leadership, Chechen 
leadership, U.S. leadership, etc.) from the perspective of 
U.S. security and defense policy, granted the role of the 
Caucasus in grand strategy between the great powers in the 
21st century. 
As Russia and other post-Soviet Republics are 
struggling to define national identities for themselves, 
narrower ethnic identities are emerging—following the 
collapse of the supranational Soviet empire.  The following 
thesis will look at how the ethnic Russian search for a 
                     
7 “Inside the corporation: Russia’s power elite,” Kavkazcenter.com, 
16 October 2007.  
http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/10/16/8970_print.html accessed 
December 4, 2007. 
8 “Thousands rally for Putin in Chechnya ahead of polls,” Times 
Internet Limited, November 27, 2007, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-2576449, prtpage-
1.coms accessed 4 December 2007. 
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cohesive sense of nationalism continues to promote the 
ethnic federalism that exists today between Russia-proper 
and its neighbors (i.e., its surrounding republics).  In 
it’s present state, Russia is promoting a national identity 
that accommodates ethnicity (which is not surprising given 
its size and heterogeneity) while other former Soviet 
republics, being smaller and less heterogeneous, are 
promoting an exclusive ethnic-based nationalism.  And as the 
demands of the Chechen Minority Group threatens the broad 
acceptance of a “true Russian nation”, ethnic federalism may 
be the only solution to achieving a constant/consistent 
peace—without reaching a true political compromise.9 
This social and political complexion of post-Soviet 
Russia and its near abroad encourages the fundamental 
question: Can true unity (and acceptance) as a unified 
Russian nation become a reality for such an ethnically 
diverse country?  The hopeful answer would be yes; however, 
the final solution of the nationalities and the Russian 
nation itself all depends upon the actions (or inactions) of 
the political and social leaders of this ethnically divided 
region of the world.  This fact brings forth such more 
specific questions as: What effects have efforts to maintain 
an ethno-federal national identity had within this region?  
Furthermore, what are the domestic and international effects 
of ethnic conflict and religious revival (i.e., Islamic 
Fundamentalism) within Russia and its surrounding republics 
(i.e., Chechnya)? 
                     
9 Henry E. Hale.  “The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why 
Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell,” Perspectives on Politics, March 
2005.  
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2.  Importance/Significance 
Given the size and past power of Russia, as well as its 
promise for the present century, Russian race/ethnic and 
religious relations are of considerable importance to the 
study of ethnic and religious conflicts throughout the 
world. These phenomena are also germane to the making of 
U.S. foreign and defense policy, given the role of the 
southern Caucasus in U.S. defense policy and what in 2007 
seems to be a revival of Russian diplomacy and strategy that 
appears to define itself in opposition to NATO and the U.S.  
The impact of such domestic conflicts can have long-lasting 
effects upon both domestic and foreign interaction, 
intervention, and policy.  Thus, the “spill-over effects” of 
ethnic conflict and radical religious revival are growing 
concerns throughout the international community.  More 
specifically to the Russian experience, the growing 
interaction of ethnic conflict and a revived Islamic 
Fundamentalism (as pursued by Separatist Chechen Rebels) 
within the Northern Caucasus region is of added concern when 
dealing with seemingly religious-based-ethnic conflicts. 
a. Misconceptions about Ethnic Conflict 
With the rise of the unpredictability of global 
terrorists since 2001, an international understanding of 
ethnic conflict is a key tool to unveiling the elements of 
international relations in the present century.  However, 
the concept of “ethnic conflict” for many observers has a 
tendency to conjure up notions of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing.  It is only by gaining a further/deeper 
understanding of the dynamics involved in the various forms 
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of ethnic conflict, that one will be able to see that 
genocide is just the most extreme expression of ethnic 
conflict in modern history and present day politics.  Race 
riots, political party infighting, and low-level harassment 
are also forms of ethnic conflict and can be observed far 
beyond the limits of Europe in the past and present. 
Such events can be motivated by various forms of 
elite versus mass-level manipulation; the intentions of the 
state versus those of civil society; individual economic 
desires; or even ancestrally developed habits or myths about 
identity, heritage and blood and soil.  As one looks at the 
unsettled state of the world today, one might ask: Is the 
future of humanity damned because of ongoing ethnic 
conflicts of today?  Are the ethnic tensions so profound 
that the only solution is to have separation (e.g., 
partitioning or ethnic federalism) as say on the model of ex 
Yugoslavia and the present day Czech and Slovak Republics? 
3. Literature Review 
The nature of ethnic and religious identity—in general—
encompasses numerous factors in addition to numerous actors.   
A leading scholar suggests that, 
… literature on evolutionary theory tends to 
address questions of ethnicity from two 
perspectives: (1) macro, or long–term selection 
processes associated with basic human preferences 
for individual or group survival, ethnic identity 
or kinship affiliations; and (2) intermediate 
selection mechanisms associated with the fitness 
and adaptability of specific cultures, religions 
or belief systems in different regions of the 
world. Comparatively less time has been spent 
addressing micro–evolutionary questions about the 
timing, escalation and duration of ethnic 
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violence — that is, micro or short–term selection 
processes and fitness mechanisms that account for 
the escalation and/or duration of ethnic hatreds, 
violence or war at a particular time.10 
--Frank P. Harvey 
In his article Constructivist Assumptions and Ethnic 
Violence, author Steven I. Wilkinson implies that the social 
construct of a truly unified (Russian) nation is a 
possibility.  He stresses that, 
[i]gnoring the fluidity of ethnic identities has 
very definite implications….  Once we accept that 
ethnic identities are multi-dimensional, we ought 
to develop a healthy skepticism about power 
sharing proposals….11 
It is here that one can see that even in the midst of 
acknowledging “multiple identities”, the permeability of 
identity barriers is a tool to be utilized in the creation 
of peaceful heterogeneity.  Thus, the “permeability” is a 
result of acknowledging the multiple identities and needs of 
the various ethnic groups of concern.  However, as ethnic 
and non-ethnic Russians struggle to be acknowledged, the 
permanent consequences of an ongoing ethnic conflict within 
and between Russia and members of the former Soviet 
Republics continue to solidify their identity barriers. 
For instance, with the creation of the organization, 
Movement Against Illegal Immigration, xenophobic (ethnic) 
                     
10 Frank P. Harvey, “Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic 
Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and Constraints for Theory and 
Policy,”  Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2000,  
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&
aid=279206 (accessed September 2, 2007). 
11 Steven Wilkinson, “Constructivist Assumptions and Ethnic 
Violence,”  APSA-C 12, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 18.   
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Russians are now encouraged to maintain their ethnic and 
cultural separation from minority groups (e.g., Chechens).  
This manner of chosen existence is deemed to be for the sake 
of preserving a purely ethnic Russia; if not at least for 
the sake of preserving their (ethnic Russians’) economic, 
social and political wellbeing.  Hence, while the “multiple 
identities” within the Russian Federation are being 
acknowledged (i.e., by using ethnic federalism); the “needs 
[all] of the various ethnic groups of concern” are being 
selfishly addressed and maintained—as by the ethnic 
Russians.  
In his article Primordialism Lives!, Stephen Van Evera 
states, 
… in modern times ethnic identities tend to 
become paramount; and once they become paramount, 
ethnic identities tend to remain paramount….  
Those who underestimate the strength and 
endurance of ethnic identities are bound to 
blunder in their dealings with nationalism.12 
As a result, the “permanent consequences” of continuous 
ethnic conflict throughout Russia and its republics may 
condemn this region of Eurasia to perpetual conflict which 
has troubling implications for U.S. foreign and defense 
policy. 
Van Evera also goes on to provide “three claims” and a 
“fourth point of qualification”: 
(1) Ethnic identities harden when mass literacy 
is achieved.  (2) Ethnic identities are hardened 
by violence.  (3)  The identities of non-
immigrant ethnic groups are far more firmly fixed 
                     
12 Stephen Van Evera, “Primordialism Lives!”  APSA-C 12, no. 1 
(Winter 2001): 20.   
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than immigrant identities.  (4) While ethnic 
identities can seldom be transformed into new 
identities, they can often be made more benign, 
and efforts in this direction can bolster 
peace.”13 
From this statement, one can conclude that as the 
identity barriers (i.e., mass literacy, violent conflict, 
and non-immigrant character) continue to persist, the future 
solutions to ethnic violence (i.e., in regards to the 
Russian search for a cohesive nationalism) may never include 
identity change.14  Two “Chechen Wars”—and now guerilla 
warfare—between Russian and Chechen Rebel forces persist in 
“hardening” the ethnic identities (and all they encompass) 
as well as “hardening” the individuals against each other. 
Current literature concerning ethnic conflict utilizes 
the following three schools of thought: Primordialism, 
Instrumentalism, and Constructivism.  It is by looking to 
elements of ethnic conflict ranging from: nature of 
identity; origins and transmission; how people identify with 
ethnic identity; and relationship to violence, that 
researchers are able to label an ethnic conflict.  These 
methods focus on how to categorize the conflict as it 
presents itself and its matching traits to their respective 
argument or theory. 
As the Primordialist and Instrumentalist approaches 
have been largely rejected by the research community, 
debates continue within the Constructivist category.  
Nonetheless, considerable mention must be made of Kaplan and 
Geertz’s discussion of the emotional ties of Primordialism.  
                     
13 Stephen Van Evera, “Primordialism Lives!”  APSA-C 12, no. 1 
(Winter 2001): 20.     
14 Van Evera, 21.   
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In their findings, deep roots and blood ties are what fuel a 
strong dedication to family and kinship.15  Also, in his 
1973 essay, Geertz proposed that, “… 1) individuals have a 
single ethnic identity and 2) this identity is fixed in the 
present and future.”16  He went on to state that, 
The key distinguishing aspect of the 
[P]rimordialist view is that an individual’s 
ethnic identity becomes immutable once acquired, 
no matter where it comes from.17 
This model of ethnic identity being “fixed at birth” 
has been strongly observed by ethnic Russians and members of 
the Russian Republic minority groups (e.g., the Chechens).  
This provides a theoretical “causal claim” for explaining 
why it appears to be—within the Post-Soviet regions—that 
“ancient hatreds” between certain ethnic groups continue to 
manifest themselves in modern times (i.e., the 2006 
restaurant brawl in Kondopoga).18 
Such “basic human preferences” have been countered by 
Constructivist findings showing that “… ethnic groups are 
fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic, and 
political processes.”19  As a result, Constructivists 
propose that: 
 
                     
15 Clifford Geertz.  “The Integrative Revolution,” Old Societies and 
New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, Clifford Geertz 
ed., New York: The Free Press, 1963, p. 109. 
16 Kanchan Chandra ed.,  “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic 
Politics,”  APSA-CP 12, no. 1 (Winter 2001):  7.   
17 Ibid.   
18 Hale, Henry E.  “The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: 
Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell,” Perspectives on Politics, 
March 2005.  
 19 Kanchan Chandra ed.,  “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic 
Politics,”  APSA-CP 12, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 7.   
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… individuals have multiple … ethnic identities; 
and … the identity with which they identify 
varies depending upon some specified causal 
variable.20 
From this statement, one could see how an individual 
could simultaneously choose to identify as being both 
ethnically Chechen and a Russian national; or identify 
separately (according to ethnicity and nationality, 
respectively) at moments that may prove more beneficial to 
him or her.  This theory has also been linked to the beliefs 
that “ethnic conflicts” are actually driven by political and 
economic “entrepreneurs” who are selfishly motivated to take 
advantage of the emotional pull of ethnic identity. 
To further support this “conscious choice” of the 
individual, Glazer and Moynihan have researched the 
manipulative and malleable nature of Instrumentalism.  
Highlighting the subjective nature and class affiliation of 
this particular school of thought, they state: 
there has been a pronounced and sudden increase 
in tendencies by people in many countries and in 
many circumstances to insist on the significance 
of their group distinctiveness and identity and 
on new rights that derive from this group 
character.21 
This theory has been set into motion as Russian hatreds 
have become emboldened by economic and social competition 
and expectations; while Chechen Rebel forces seek complete 
independence from “Mother Russia”.  The increasing minority 
(i.e., Chechen) monopoly over local Russian markets, 
                     
 20 Kanchan Chandra ed.,  “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic 
Politics,”  APSA-CP 12, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 7.   
 21 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, “Introduction.”  Ethnicity: 
Theory and Experience, edited by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, 
3-26.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, 3. 
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construction, and daily duties has left ethnic Russians 
feeling disadvantaged in their own homelands.22  On the 
other hand, Chechen Separatists (fueled by radical Islamic 
beliefs) see ethnic Russians as “monopolizing” control over 
the Chechen Republic.  Thus, political and economic 
components of ethnic (and religious) conflict lend 
themselves to the action (or inaction) from local 
authorities and the election of deputies who are “not averse 
to playing the nationalities card.”23 
Finally, Benedict Anderson and Fearon and Laitin 
provide research using the theory of Constructivism.  
Anderson points to the “imagined communities” characteristic 
of a socially constructed society.24  Fearon and Laitin look 
at how “identities” are socially constructed: 
Social categories … [are distinguished by] (1) rules of 
membership … [and] (2) … sets of characteristics (such as 
beliefs, desires, moral commitments, and physical attributes 
….25 
This statement is evidenced by the social grouping of 
Chechen Rebels.  Led by Chechen Separatist Leader Dokku 
Umarov, this group insists upon obtaining independence from 
Russia.  In a recent statement (November 22nd, 2007), as 
                     
22 “Economic, political factors seen at play in northern Russia 
ethnic riots,” BBC Worldwide. 
Monitoring, September 6, 2006, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.miluniverse/document (accessed 12 October 
2006). 
23 Ibid.   
24 Benedict Anderson.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism.  New York: Verso, 1983, p.6. 
25 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Violence and the Social 
Construction of Ethnic Identity.”  International Organization 54 (4) 
(Autumn 2000), p. 848. 
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Umarov declares himself emir of the North Caucasus he urges 
the “Mujahideen” (Chechen Rebels) to 
… reject any laws, rules and establishments that 
do not come from Allah … [and to] wage 
irreconcilable war with anyone who would oppose 
the establishment of [a Muslim nation].26 
Fearon proposes that “… ethnic war [is] the result of a 
‘commitment problem’.”27 
As such, he states that, 
… the majority ethnic group cannot credibly 
commit to protecting the rights of the minority 
in the future.  Anticipating that its rights will 
be trampled on in the future, the minority group 
rebels in the present.28 
An example of this notion can be found in Chechen 
Conflicts of the past and the present-day “small-scale 
guerilla conflict” raging on between Russian forces and 
Chechen rebels.29  While some members of Chechnya tend to 
favor Putin (e.g., Chechen President/chief, Ramzan Kadyrov) 
many members—of the Chechen Republic—are still leery of the 
promises of the Kremlin government.  For instance, a 2007 
CRS Report notes: 
                     
26 “The official version of Amir Dokka’s statement of declaration of 
the Caucasian Emirate,” Kavkaz-Center News Agency, November 22, 2007, 
http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/22/9107.shtml accessed 4 
December 2007.   
27 Van Evera, 9. 
28 Ibid.   
29  “Thousands rallied on November 27th, 2007 in the capital of the 
war-ravaged province of Chechnya in support of President Vladimir Putin 
and his United Russia party.  Chechnya’s President/chief, Ramzan 
Kadryrov is a former rebel who switched his allegiance to the Kremlin.”  
Information and quote taken from: “Thousands rally for Putin in Chechnya 
ahead of polls,” Times Internet Limited, November 27, 2007, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-2576449, prtpage-
1.coms accessed 4 December 2007.  
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Major problems remain: 18% of the population 
lives below the poverty line, foreign investment 
is low, and crime, corruption, capital flight and 
unemployment remain high.30 
The above mentioned theories, in reference to ethnic 
(and religious) conflicts, are of significant value to 
understanding unresolved ethnic and religious conflict.  
However, there appears to be a gap in regards to observing 
how such conflicts transition.  Is it possible for 
individuals to change their motivations over time, while 
also changing their method for inducing ethnic conflict?  
More specifically, is it possible for contemporary ethnic 
groups to revert back to a more “primitive” method of social 
containment (e.g., ethno- federalism); and yet the end 
result continues to be ethnic conflict?31  Are the religious 
and ethnic conflicts of today guiding us back to a state of 
“ethnic backwardness”?  I would venture to say yes, while 
also highlighting the fact that the “primordial nature” of 
ethnic identity tends to be forgotten in a time of relative 
peace and security; only to be revived during conflict and 
turmoil. 
4. Methodology 
Research has found Chechens to be 
                     
30CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security 
Issues and U.S. Interests, by Stuart D. Goldman, May 31st, 2007, 
summary.     
31 In Henry E. Hale’s “The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: 
Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell”, he notes some of the successes 
(e.g., India, Spain and Switzerland) for ethnofederalism; and failures 
(e.g., USSR and the Nigerian First Republic).  
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… indigenous Caucasian mountain people … [with 
existing] clan relationships … still play[ing] a 
large role in relations among [them] ….32 
This fact provides a possible indication as to why the 
actual “evolution” of Russian ethnic/social interactions 
(and ultimately Post-Soviet ethnic and religious conflict) 
has not totally “progressed forward” towards a truly 
peaceful coexistence.  This thesis will provide an 
historical analysis to fill the gap within current 
literature concerning ethnic conflict theory (e.g., 
religious-driven ethnic conflicts).  It will look at the 
connection between ethnic and religious identity and the 
tendencies and motivations of leaders driving the Post-
Soviet ethnic and religious conflicts of today (e.g., both 
Russian leadership versus Chechen leadership).  It will also 
present current (domestic and international) perspectives on 
Russian ethnic identity, Russian nationalism, and radical 
religious movements (i.e., the revival of Islamic 
Fundamentalism); while highlighting certain chosen methods 
of social interaction/containment as the causal elements 
behind unresolved Post-Soviet ethnic and religious conflicts 
of today. 
5. Sources 
A systematic approach will be utilized in this 
discussion of Post-Soviet ethnic identity, Post-Soviet 
ethnic conflict, and the Post-Soviet revival of radical 
religion (i.e., Islamic Fundamentalism).  The main focus  
 
                     
32 Christopher Panico.  Conflicts in the Caucasus: Russia’s War in 
Chechnya.  London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and 
Terrorism, 1995, 2.  
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will be the North Caucasus region of Chechnya.  Firsthand 
accounts, published secondary sources and reputable websites 
will be used in this research. 
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II. UNRESOLVED ETHNIC CONFLICT IN RUSSIA 
Even though “major combat operations have ceased “… 
small-scale guerilla conflict continues between Russian and 
Chechen Rebel forces”.33  This provides evidence that 
unresolved ethnic conflict continues to exist within the 
Russian Federation.  This chapter will discuss the elements 
which make up and/or relate to “ethnic conflict” in Russia 
such as: the “Chechen Element” of the Post-Soviet ethnic 
conflicts of the 21st century; the role/influence of 
political and social leaders in addition to radical elites; 
domestic and international concerns (e.g., effects upon 
economic and foreign policy) in regards to Post-Soviet 
ethnic conflicts; solutions to this problem; and the future 
of ethnic conflict in Russia. 
A.  THE CHECHEN ELEMENT 
As media coverage has tended to focus on the recent 
“Chechen Wars” of the last decade, this strife is far from a 
“new” ethnic conflict.  The foundations of this ongoing 
violence can be traced back to major rebellions against 
Tsarist Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries.34  As 
                     
33  “Thousands rally for Putin in Chechnya ahead of polls,” Times 
Internet Limited, November 27, 2007, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-2576449, prtpage-
1.coms accessed 4 December 2007. 
34 Ben Fowkes, ed.  Russia and Chechnia: The Permanent Crisis (Great 
Britain: MacMillan Press, 1998), 90.  There are numerous sources 
documenting the history of Russian-Chechen relations such as Geoffrey 
Hosking’s Russia and the Russians: A History (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), chaps. 3, 4 and 5; Anatol 
Lieven’s Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998), chap. 9; and Paul J. Murphy’s The Wolves of 
Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror (Washington: Brassey’s 
Inc., 2004), 1. 
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subsequent years saw the massive deportation of Chechens 
during Stalin’s Communist rule, conflicts of the 1990’s have 
led to a surge in major debates regarding legitimate Russian 
ethnic identity, leadership, nationalism, and territorial 
integrity.35 
At the onset of conflict in the Chechen Republic, 
Russian leadership’s immediate concern was to preserve the 
national integrity of Russia in the midst of the Soviet 
collapse.  The Chechen conflicts of the mid-1990s resulted 
in a double win for the Chechen minority group.  As the 
rugged terrain of their mountainous homelands was ideal for 
their guerilla warfare—they were unstoppable against the 
disorganized Russian military forces of the early 1990s.36  
This “conflict” proved to be a never-ending struggle for 
both sides.   
The Chechens declared their independence from Russia in 
1991, but the international community joined Russia in 
refusing to recognize its sovereignty.37  Nonetheless, oil 
proved to be an additional interest held by many within the 
Russian, Chechen and international realms of political and 
economic leadership.  As a result, Chechen oil became an 
instrumentally vital economic interest as far back as the 
late 19th century with the rise of the oil economy.38  Such 
struggles for national identity/self-rule and competition 
for economic resources continue on today, both domestically—
in the Post-Soviet world—and within the international arena. 
                     
35 Ben Fowkes, ed.  Russia and Chechnia: The Permanent Crisis , 65. 
36 “Q & A: The Chechen Conflict,” BBC News, July 10, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe, accessed 13 December 2006. 
37 Paul B. Henze, Islam in the North Caucasus: The Example of Chechnya, 
(Santa Monica: RAND Publishers, 1995), 2. 
38 Paul B. Henze, Islam in the North Caucasus, 2. 
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B.  POST-SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND RADICAL ELITES 
Ethnic or religious tensions when joined with mass 
politics in the past and present may tend to lead to 
conflict due to their politically charged natures, 
especially when matters of blood and soil intrude as has 
generally been the case in Chechnya.  For example: in 1991, 
Chechnya’s first president, Jokhar Musaevich Dudaev, led his 
country to declare its independence from Russian rule.39  
Such mobilizing efforts by various political elites, 
combined with the obedience of the masses, have shaped this 
deeply divided Russian society in the past and especially in 
the present.  In fact, additional leaders such as Aslan 
Maskhadov and Russian Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir 
Putin have also contributed to the ongoing propaganda 
encouraging this conflict. 
Boris Yeltsin—in his time—made a disastrous use of 
constructive manipulation.  As upcoming presidential 
elections were taking form, Yeltsin used the first Chechen 
Conflict of 1991 to assert his leadership of the nation.  
His actions resulted in an embarrassing military defeat for 
the Russian military; loss of domestic support; and a more 
intensified ethnic conflict that lurched on for years 
afterwards.40 
Today, many Chechens favor President Putin; with 
Chechen Separatist Rebels (a.k.a. Mujahideens) continuing 
their charge towards separation from “Mother Russia.”  
Nonetheless, political elites continue to play a catalytic 
                     
39 Paul B. Henze, Islam in the North Caucasus, 23. 
40 Gail W. Lapidus and Renee de Nevers, eds., Nationalism, Ethnic 
Identity and Conflict Management in Russia Today  (Stanford, CA: Center 
for International Security Arms Control, 1995), 11. 
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role in the progression or regression of ethnic and 
religious relations.  Ethnic activists and political power 
seekers can build upon and manipulate the fears and 
insecurity generated within the masses by various incidents.  
As elites are necessary to interpret and make cultural 
identity politically significant; ethnic biases can also be 
shaped by institutional incentives.  The result of such 
elite manipulation is typically a political polarization of 
society. 
As many ethnic groups tend to use deep roots and blood 
ties to fuel a strong dedication to family and kinship, 
Russian elites have used this tool as a way of motivating 
the masses for destructive action—making it easier for them 
to believe the elite-driven propaganda machines behind the 
conflict. 41 Such is the legacy of nationalism in modern 
Russian history and the use of nationalism in post communism 
generally in Europe as a means of political mobilization.  
An example of this method was evidenced in how Russian 
forces, uncertain of their true military purpose or goal, 
stormed Chechen communities during the recent conflicts in 
combat that resembled the fighting in Stalingrad in 1942. 
This situation can be viewed as evidence to support 
explanations of how individuals can develop a deep 
psychological need to belong to a political, social and 
ethnic group in the face of the us/them dynamic of modern 
nationalism.  This phenomenon provides the rationale and 
answer to the question: Why do followers follow the leaders 
of such identity, ethnic or nationalist groups?  Such 
                     
41 Clifford Geertz.  “The Integrative Revolution.”  In Old Societies 
and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, edited by 
Clifford Geertz, New York: The Free Press, 1963, 109. 
 21
reasoning brings to light a further understanding of why the 
Russian “military masses” were so easily coerced into 
generating massive levels of ethnic violence.  The emotional 
power of ethnic attachments tends to drive—and continues to 
drive the course of the Russian-Chechen ethnic and religious 
conflicts. 
1. International and Domestic Post-Soviet 
Perspectives 
As politically elite leaders continue to be motivated 
by social, economic, and/or political gains, the future of 
the entire Russian nation begs contemplation.  A study 
conducted by the USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, 
in 1995, presented 100 Russian teenagers with questions 
about their future and that of the ethnic conflict between 
ethnic Russians and Chechens.  The results showed that many 
of the teenagers were doubtful about both their future, and 
that of their nation.  Bleak responses revealed that many of 
the youth “sympathized” with their parents.  As a result, 
they understood the communist-induced despair and oppression 
of their parents’ backgrounds; but lacked any true sense of 
self identity.42 
In his book, Russia in Search of Itself, James 
Billington states: 
[Teens] accept uncertainty, float in and out of 
politics, and are less concerned with their 
ultimate destination…..43 
                     
42 Richard Dobson and Anatole Shub.  Russia’s Future: Perspectives of 
Young Russians, 1994-1995.  Office of Research and Media Reaction U.S. 
Information Agency, March 1995, 5.  
43 James H. Billington, Russia in Search of Itself  (Washington D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press), 139.   
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This statement coincides with the visions of the 
Russian youth of 1995.  The same panel of teenagers 
described their lack of confidence in both the presiding 
president and the Russian government, as a whole.44  
Concluding thoughts revealed that the youth of 1995’s Russia 
felt that the ethnic conflict between Russia and Chechnya 
would continue on for years to come.45 
With Russian President, Vladimir Putin, the Russian 
government denies the “human catastrophe” that is 
internationally perceived as the “Russian-Chechen” conflict.  
Infact, they have gone as far as to “reject foreign 
interference in Chechnya”.46  And while Putin’s shift to 
nationalism has spawned domestic and international concerns 
(i.e., over the power of a “revived and revitalized” Russian 
superpower), Russian expert—Michael McFaul—has recently 
observed that: 
Putin has rebuilt autocracy at home by 
undermining the power of regional leaders, 
independent media, both houses of parliament, 
independent political parties and civil society.  
[His] regime also has made it increasingly 
difficult for U.S. business and nongovernmental 
organizations to operate in Russia.  As Russia’s 
retreat from democratic values increasingly 
becomes a source of tension between it and the 
West, Moscow, in turn, sees less value in trying 
to cooperate with NATO, the European Union and 
the U.S.47 
                     
44 Richard Dobson and Anatole Shub.  Russia’s Future, 25.  
45 Richard Dobson and Anatole Shub.  Russia’s Future, 23. 
46 CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security 
Issues and U.S. Interests, by Stuart D. Goldman, May 31, 2007, 8.     
47 “New Russia, new threat,” Los Angeles Times, September 2, 2007.  
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/sunday/commentary/la-op-
mcfaul2sep02,0,1062795.story?coll=la-sunday-commentary  accessed 28 
November 2007, 2. 
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Thus, Putin appears to be intensely focused on building upon 
the strengths of his Post-Soviet “superpower” nation.  As a 
result, the previous U.S.-Russian ties of 9/11 have 
diminished in the midst of “Putin’s increasingly sharp 
criticism of the United States in 2007”.48 
C.  FROM CONFLICT TO SOLUTION: PEACE AGREEMENTS IN THE 
WAKE OF THE COLLAPSED USSR 
1.  Peace Agreements 
Previous attempts to solve the Russo-Chechen 
conflict have not been very successful.  Past problems 
with achieving “credible commitments” from leaders of 
both Russia and the Chechen Republic have left 
everyone unwilling to compromise.  Even as numerous 
cease fire agreements have been attempted, violence 
continues to split peace agreements; while the legal 
status of secessionist-Chechnya remains elusive.49  
Furthermore, in 1992, Chechnya refused to sign the 
Federation Treaty that would regulate relationships 
among Russia’s republics and the central government.50 
Another obstacle to generating true Russian national 
identity on a peaceful basis—and peace for all ethnic groups 
within Russia—may be in the manner in which Russian history 
is understood in blood and soil as well as integral 
                     
48 CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security 
Issues and U.S. Interests, by Stuart D. Goldman, May 31st, 2007, 16.     
49 Edward W. Walker, No Peace, No War in the Caucasus: Secessionist 
Conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.  Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1998, 2. 
50 Stephen J. Blank and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Russia’s Invasion of 
Chechnya, 3. 
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nationalist/romantic terms.  To be sure, the Russians are 
heirs to Herder’s ideal of cultural nationalism, which in 
the 20th century took a turn towards genocide.   This fact 
may have contributed to the way ethnic Russians and Chechens 
think about themselves and each other still in the integral 
nationalist terms of the blood and soil thinkers of the 19th 
and 20th centuries.  Thus, by generating peace agreements 
with the detailed intentions of improving social and 
economic situations for all members of society, a unified 
sense of nationalism can be made possible in which the 
Chechen nationality exists peacefully within the Russian 
nation state as a whole. 
However, as the natural progression of ethnic conflict 
and ethnic violence between Russia and Chechnya continues, 
the possibility of achieving a legitimate and lasting peace 
should not be forgotten.  While societal structures often 
influence which identities come to dominate social cleavages 
and political identities, the Chechens have already adopted 
a Constitution, “… entirely free of ethnic or religious 
particularism.”51  The 2007 Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) Report states: 
In March 2003, Russian authorities conducted a 
referendum in Chechnya on a new Chechen constitution 
that gives the region limited autonomy within the 
Russian Federation.52 
Nonetheless, true Russian national unity on an integral 
ethnic basis will never be achieved until there is a forum 
for peaceful communicating of ideas about identity and 
                     
51 Paul B. Henze, Islam in the North Caucasus, 34. 
52 CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security 
Issues and U.S. Interests, by Stuart D. Goldman, May 31, 2007, 7.     
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ethnicity in which citizenship loses its blood and soil 
taint of violence.  Strong civic ties are necessary in order 
to unite communities; while eliminating ethnically biased 
myths and prejudices that all too often degenerate into 
ethnic violence.  Hence, an “imagined” Russian nation can be 
the starting point for generating a truly cohesive Russian 
nation. Leadership (and society as a whole) must take a page 
from the experience of central and Western Europe where 
former ethnic conflicts have been peacefully resolved 
without the extremes as seen in the first half of the 20th 
century and more recently in ex-Yugoslavia. 
D.  ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE OF THE POST-SOVIET 
REGION 
1.  An Immediate Solution: Ethnic Federalism 
Research has suggested that the plausibility of a 
partition or ethnic federalism to achieve a higher level of 
ethnic peace is within reason—as an answer of policy.  Thus, 
suggestions in regards to mechanisms of conflict regulation, 
territorial solutions, and federalism have been provided by 
scholars and makers of policy.  However, each suggestion is 
specifically focused on the mechanisms of conflict 
regulation; nonetheless, there are two elements of concern.  
Territorial solutions (e.g., partitioning and federalism) 
look to separate ethnic groups.  Institutional solutions—
constitutional structural options such as electoral 
institutional devices and policy devices—tend to focus on 
the issue of ethnic identities and potential ethnic 
conflict. 
Territorial solutions assume that groups are 
geographically concentrated.  Partitioning assumes that 
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ethnic groups will always have incompatible claims and will 
never get along.  This “incompatibility” can be seen within 
the Russian-Chechen conflict between Chechen Separatists and 
Russian forces.  As a result, the incompatibilities continue 
to manifest themselves (e.g., guerrilla conflict, race 
riots, harassment, etc.)  And in order to avoid conflict and 
violence, each ethnic group needs their own state or a 
territorially distinct and separate manner of existence 
(i.e., Post-Soviet ethno federalism). 
Thus, after considering the method of partitioning, 
federalism appears to be the most plausible suggestion for 
achieving a durable peace within the Russian Federation.    
However, in order for the Post-Soviet method of ethno 
federalism to be “successful”, there must be significant 
decentralization of power.  Hence, federated states—seeking 
a unified nation—must reduce the importance of controlling 
power at the center by multiplying the entrance points into 
the governing system.  The end result is the promotion of a 
balance of power between the center and the regions. 
Federalism also provides for multiple tiers of power 
and access to political opportunities.  By constructing 
these tiers in the proper manner, it is possible to 
reinforce ethnic identities or to cross-cut and ideally de-
emphasize ethnic bonds.  This method is the ideal way of 
constructively maintaining a multi-ethnic (and multi-
religious) Russian Federation. 
2. A Durable Peace 
The previous suggestions are methods that may guarantee 
a more lasting and immediate peace between ethnic Russians 
and Chechens.  As the current situation continues its 
 27
course, violence persists as Chechen rebel leaders wage war 
against Russian military forces and “anyone who wages war 
against Islam and Muslims”.53  As a result, the possibility 
of spill-over into other countries has become a major 
concern.54 And as 
… Russia remains a nuclear superpower … [it] will 
play a major role in determining the national 
security environment in Europe, the Middle East, 
and Asia ….  Such issues as the war on terrorism, 
the future of NATO, and the U.S. role in the 
world will all be affected by developments in 
Russia.55 
However, in order to avoid further bloodshed and 
despair, immediate action must be taken by the leadership 
within the Russian government and the Chechen Republic.  As 
social and political identities are shaped by the political, 
social and economic motivations of the elite; the continuing 
influence of various fears, ancient hatreds and social 
resentment may result in rage.  Thus, destruction can only 
be avoided by taking immediate action towards peaceful 
conflict resolution.  Both sides must be willing to consider 
territorial solutions, institutional solutions, or policy 
choices.  While partitioning will encourage peaceful co-
existence, care must be taken in that a haphazard use of 
federalism can be constructed in such a manner so as to 
reinforce ethnic identities and encourage further conflict.  
                     
53“The official version of Amir Dokka’s statement of declaration of 
the Caucasian Emirate,” Kavkaz-Center News Agency, November 22, 2007, 
http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/22/9107.shtml accessed 4 
December 2007.   
54 “Q & A: The Chechen Conflict,” BBC News, July 10, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe accessed 13 December 2006. 
55 CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security 
Issues and U.S. Interests, by Stuart D. Goldman, May 31st, 2007, 3.     
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Again, it must never be forgotten that the elite play a 
catalytic role in the progression or regression of ethnic 
(and religious) relations; such actors are the “architects” 
of a peaceful Post-Soviet-multi-ethnic-co-existence. 
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III.  RELIGIOUS REVIVAL AND THE EURASIA MOVEMENT 
In Russia—and many of its surrounding republics—the 
significance of religious identity has begun to overshadow 
previous social issues such as: ethnic identity; the Russian 
search for nationalism on a secular basis; and self-
determination on behalf of the Russian republics.  As 
separatist and radical movements have begun to energize 
Islamic fundamentalists throughout the Russian federation, 
Islamic fundamentalism has become a growing concern to 
makers of policy and citizens of Russia.  As supporters for 
this system of radicalized religion seek to reign over a 
growing insurgency in the northern Caucasus region, a sense 
of growing destabilization is felt throughout the Russian 
federation.56 
As previously stated, the issues of religious and 
ethnic conflicts throughout the Post-Soviet regions are of 
considerable importance to the study of ethnic and religious 
conflicts throughout the world both because this theme has 
merit in itself and because of Russia’s impact on the 
international system of Eurasia.  The impact of such 
domestic conflicts can have long-lasting effects upon both 
domestic and foreign interaction, intervention, and policy 
(e.g., GWOT).  In addition to such possibilities, the 
growing impact of Islamic Fundamentalism within the Northern 
Caucasus region is of even greater concern to Russian 
                     
56  “North Caucasus: Analyst Warns of Rising Radical Islam,”  Radio 
Free Europe, May 5, 2006, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/3A1DAC8B-4D1D-488A-BBE0-
36749AFA816A.html accessed 14 March 2007, 1. 
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leadership due to the increased spreading of this radical 
form of religion (i.e., spill-over-effects). 
Far from the Caucasus, on the western borders of the 
Russian Federation, social tensions have given rise to 
ethnic conflict in the Karelian town of Kondopoga; such 
group distinctiveness can also be attributed to religious 
affiliation (i.e., Islamic Fundamentalism).  And so, in the 
case of the Russian Federation, the “beliefs and desires” of 
its peoples, that is, of nationalities within the Russian 
whole, continue to be cause for major concern.  Islamic 
Fundamentalism has taken the “socially constructed 
identities” of individuals within the North Caucasus region 
to extremely dangerous levels of organized violence. 
This has resulted in the “imagined communities” of 
Islamic Fundamentalists (i.e., Chechen Separatists) giving 
rise to religious conflicts within the Russian Federation.  
Such “contemporary Post-Soviet ethno-religious groups” 
appear to be using religion to fill the niche of “social 
justice”; moreover, they are reverting back to a more 
“primitive” method of social interaction—with less tolerance 
and acceptance of ethnic and religious differences.  The end 
result continues to be ethnic and religious conflicts.57 
This chapter seeks to bridge the gap in regards to 
ethno-religious conflict theory.  It will discuss topics 
such as: Islamic Fundamentalism in Russia; Muslim Revival in 
the North Caucasus region (i.e., “The Chechen Element”); the 
                     
57  As Radical Islamists wage jihad against Russia and the West; the 
allure of this radical religion is drawing in “disillusioned young 
people” throughout the North Caucasus region.  Information taken from: 
“The Battle for the Soul of Chechnya,” Guardian News and Media Limited, 
November 22, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,331329941103495,00.html  accessed 4 
December 2007. 
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reawakening of Russian nationalism as a by-product of the 
Muslim Revival; Domestic and International concerns about 
radical Islam; the role/influence of the Russian state in 
regards to religious and/or ethnic conflict; and the future 
of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Soviet regions (i.e., 
Chechnya). 
A.  ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN RUSSIA 
As the word “fundamentalism” implies “the basics”, the 
religion of Islam is intended to be a way of life.  The 
ultimate sacrifice is to rid oneself of sin and reach 
Heaven.  Even though its Five Pillars promote: 
faith/acceptance, prayer five times a day, fasting, charity, 
and embarking upon the sacred Hajj/Pilgrimage; the present 
day international assumptions about this “radical religion” 
are causing many individuals (and countries) to categorize 
it as a form of “global terrorism”.  Thus, its revival 
within regions such as Chechnya is opening the eyes of the 
international world (i.e., the U.S.) to the situations 
present there. 
As a result of the growing concerns surrounding radical 
religion, the expression of religious identity within the 
Post-Soviet region is becoming more of a threat than the 
preservation of ethnic identity.  Promoted as a cause for 
“social justice”, Islamic Fundamentalism is developing into 
a domestic and international threat to both peace and 
security.58  In the case of Russia and its surrounding 
republics: What are the limits regarding the 
                     
58“The Battle for the Soul of Chechnya,” Guardian News and Media 
Limited, November 22, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,331329941103495,00.html. Accessed 4 
December 2007. 
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influence/effects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern 
Caucasus region?  As fear of this “radical religion” 
spreads, it is a major concern for the Russian state and 
society.  And as drastic acts (and measures) are being 
pursued—by both sides of this Post-Soviet conflict—an 
outsider must surely hope that such conflict will be 
curtailed for the sake of religious and social tolerance in 
Russia and beyond. 
To be sure, the 21st century appears to be marked by 
political violence associated with religious awakenings of 
various stripes.   When one analyzes ethnic conflicts of 
today, it is also imperative that one analyze the religious 
aspects of such conflicts.  Such an analysis will allow 
readers to look at how religious elements/perspectives may 
contribute to the continued ethnic division throughout the 
Russian Federation.  Thus, by examining the limits and 
effects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Soviet 
regions, a greater global understanding and awareness of 
this religious revival can be achieved (and thus utilized) 
by makers of policy. 
The religion of Islam is perceived to have “two faces”—
“tolerance and extremism”.59  It is, 
… probably best explained [as a religion] seeking 
to address secular social problems through the 
consistent promulgation of an ideal social 
justice not attainable outside the context of an 
Islamic state.  [However,] …the true Islamic 
state derives its strength from the unity of 
religious and secular power, something that 
Muslim liberals actively object to.60 
                     
59 Stephen Schwartz.  The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism 
and Its Role in Terrorism.  New York: Doubleday.  2003, 32. 
60 Trenin, 71.   
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Thus, as they are found to exist in the Muslim 
countries of North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia,  
“… the goal of Islamic Fundamentalists is to create national 
governments based on the principles and values of Islam.”61 
An additional goal is to restore social justice based on 
Islamic law.  And the different trends of Islam differ in 
the form of government they seek and in how strictly they 
believe the government should interpret the law.62   
Nonetheless, Islamic Fundamentalism, in the North Caucasus 
is—in a regional context—inclusive of, “… ethno-cultural and 
religious relationships in the Caucasus and the development 
of Islam in the Russian Federation.”63 
However, as Post-Soviet Islamic Fundamentalism is 
perceived as a battle between Russia and Chechnya, research 
has shown that there are more (Post-Soviet) countries of 
interest than originally considered.64  In addition, notions 
that the influence/effects of Islamic fundamentalism in the 
Northern Caucasus region may lead to an “ethno-religious” 
situation continue to promote the ethnic federalism that 
exists today between Russia and the Russian Republics.  As 
an ethnically and religiously diverse country, the Russian 
Federation continues to seek a cohesively unified national 
identity while the rest of the world awaits a durable 
political, social, economic and cultural basis for Russian 
political culture in the 21st century, while asking: What  
 
                     
61 “Islamic Fundamentalism”, Encarta article, 1.   
62  Ibid.     
63  Ibid.   
64 “Islam in the North Caucasus.”  Archives de Sciences Sociales des 
Religions  115, 93-110, July-September 2001, 1. 
 34
are the permanent—international and domestic—consequences of 
the ongoing religious and ethnic conflicts with (and within) 
Russia? 
B.  THE CHECHEN ELEMENT 
1.  The North Caucasus Region 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
Federation was established on January 1, 1992.65  The 
breakdown of the Russian Federation is as follows: 
89—federative units; 21—constituent republics; 6—
territories; 49—regions; and 2—cities of federal 
importance (Moscow and St. Petersburg).66 
The battle over self-determination and territorial integrity 
has been an ongoing issue for members of the Russian 
Republics (i.e., the North Caucasus).  Furthermore, the 
“collapse” of the Soviet Union has resulted in an “unstable” 
Russian Federation in which the surrounding republics 
attempt to remain autonomous—demanding sovereignty and 
political acknowledgement from Russia.67 
A considerable amount of global attention has been 
placed upon the North Caucasus region.  Incorporated into 
the Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries, this area 
was “perceived as both marginal and dangerous.”68  Over 
time, conflicts such as the Chechen Wars have revived 
cultural and political interests towards the region. 
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As the North Caucasus region borders the independent 
states of Georgia and Azerbaijan, it is an important trading 
route—strategically positioned for oil pipelines.  Secondly, 
as the “literal and symbolic” border between Europe and 
Asia, it is also the border between two of the region’s 
major religions, Christianity and Islam.69  This is why the 
revival of Islam (i.e., in radical form) has been a major 
cause for concern throughout the Russian Federation. 
Home to at least 40 distinct ethnic groups, religion is 
an integral part of the various cultures found throughout 
the Russian Federation. 70  Reports have shown that some of 
the groups are related either by “religion, language, or way 
of life.”71  Thus, the social constructs of ethnicity and 
religious affiliation are used to form “networks” among the 
inhabitants of the Russian Federation (i.e., the North 
Caucasus region).  Islam, Christianity, and Judaism are the 
three major forms of religion found throughout the Northern 
Caucasus region.72  Historically, while the Islamic religion 
has played a unifying role during the long war of 
Independence against Russian colonization in the 18th and 
19th centuries; it was also a medium for ethnic networking 
during deportations to central Asia.73  (NOTE: Much to the 
contrary, it has been reported that “religion does not form 
the basis for hostility between groups.”  Nonetheless, they 
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are continuously labeled as “Christian-Muslim conflicts”—
according to Western reporters.)74 
The North Caucasus regions are known as Russia’s 
“Muslim republics.”  They are as follows: Dagestan, 
Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkharia, Karachai-
Cherkessia, Adygea, and North Ossettia (about 20% of the 
population).  The “historical center of Islam in the North 
Caucasus is Dagestan.”75  These seven republics join the 
“Volga republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as part of 
the, 
21 “national” members of the [Russian] 
federation—all republics with their own 
constitutions and national autonomy; and [the 
above mentioned Post-Soviet states] belong 
historically and culturally to the “Islamic 
world”....  There are also Muslim communities in 
western Russia, including Moscow, the Volga-Urals 
region and Siberia.76 
According to Islamic Specialist, Dr. Mikhail Roshchin, 
“Islam is the biggest religion in [the] North Caucasus.”77  
In addition, there appears to be a common link between the 
revival of Islamic Fundamentalism and a surge in ethnic and 
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Sergei Markedonov states that, “… ethnic nationalism in 
Russia’s North Caucasus region is beginning to give way to a 
new ideology—radical Islam.”78 
2  Islam in the Chechen Republic 
“The Islamisation of the mountain peoples took place 
over a period stretching from the 8th to the 19th 
centuries.”79  It is the Islamic Fundamentalism, within 
Chechnya, that encourages the use of the “Islamic Factor.”80   
Hence, Chechnya has become an, “… exporter of radical Islam 
to Muslim regions of Russia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent states.”81 And as Islam has become an, 
… extremely secularized religion in which the 
religious motivations have stimulated and guided 
political ambitions of radicals… the political 
and ideological trends [of radical Islam] help 
Chechnya to stand out from other crises in the 
Muslim world.”82 
Thus, separatists have declared jihad on Russia and the 
West—“proclaiming Chechnya, under the name Ichkeria, an 
Islamic republic, complete with Shariah law.”83 
There are numerous internal social and economic factors 
contributing to the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism 
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throughout the Russian Federation.  To an extent, this has 
resulted in a loss of loyalty to the Russian Federation and 
moral degradation within the Russian society.84  Even so, 
… the transformation of the Chechen ethnic 
nationalism into a religious movement catalyzed 
the rise of nationalist and religious sentiments 
among other Muslim people of the North Caucasus… 
especially… among the young people. 85 
Such radical movements (associated with Islam) are 
connected to the earlier pan-Caucasian Movement as the 
political characteristics of Islam—in this region of the 
world—have taken on the essence of past historic actions in 
protest of Russian imperialism and Soviet Communism.  This 
has led to present-day social protests that have assumed a 
religious form—calling for social justice and the 
establishment of fair government. 
C.  ISLAMIC TRENDS 
Islam reached the Caucasus region in the middle 
of the seventh century as part of the Arab 
conquest of the Iranian Sassanid Empire, many 
centuries before Russian expansion into this 
region.86 
The cultural mindset—in regards to religious identity—is 
represented by a broad spectrum within Russia.87  There 
exists many “faces of Islam”.  Such faces (i.e., trends) 
consist of the “traditional and reformist Sufi and orthodox 
folkloric and academic variations.”  In addition, other 
                     
84 Trenin, 80. 
85 Trenin, 80.  
86 Shireen Hunter.  2004.  Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity 
and Security.  Armonk:M.E. Sharpe, 3.   
87 “Islam in the North Caucasus,” 1. 
 39
elements along the spectrum of “Muslim” people in the 
Russian Federation are: Volga Tatars—very strong connections 
with Russia and the Russians; and ethnic groups in Dagestan—
living in traditionalistic local cultures.88 
Shireen T. Hunter observes that Hanafi has, 
“[historically been] the dominant branch of Islam” 
throughout the Muslim Republics.  Although, there is one 
exception—Dagestan, dominated by Shafei tradition.  It is 
within the North Caucasus—especially Dagestan, where 
mystical traditions of Islam (Sufism) have been the most 
influential.  Thus, the influence of Islamic trends have 
been felt within the Muslim regions of the Russian 
Federation over the past 20 years—accelerated due to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.89 
Nontraditional or Radical Islam can be found in the 
traditions of Salafiyya, Wahhabism.  “Wahhabism is an 
orthodox branch of Sunni Islam, or jihadism.”90  It is 
considered to be a, “… local Caucasian promoting 
fundamentalist movement, which defies Sufi tradition.”91   
In this radical version of Islam, social and political goals 
are to be achieved by violent means or through the waging of 
holy war.  However, the universal appeal of radical Islam 
within the Russian Federation can be attributed to 
institutional weakness, social and economic factors, as well 
as cultural and political causes.92 
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1.  The Many Forms of Nationalism in the Wake of the 
Collapsed USSR: A Revival of Ethnic and National 
Awareness 
Reasons behind the reemergence of Muslim communities 
vary by country and region.93  Nonetheless, the general 
factors are quite similar.  Economic, political, and social 
issues top the list of factors contributing to the Islamic 
conversion of the inhabitants of the Post-Soviet regions.  
Examples of political factors include: the growing 
corruption and mismanagement of Russian leadership—yielding 
a high degree of mistrust between Russia and its surrounding 
republics. 
Other “common threads” include: 
... widespread feelings of failure and loss of 
self esteem in many Muslim societies, combined 
with overcrowded cities with insufficient social 
support systems, high unemployment rates, and a 
growing gap between rich and poor.94 
Such circumstances have fueled further discontent among 
minority groups throughout the Russian Federation (i.e., the 
North Caucasus region)—resulting in a call for social 
change.  It is this call, which appears to have become the 
seed of radical Islam—Islamic Fundamentalism—in the Post-
Soviet era. 
As such, several approaches have been taken, in regards 
to explaining the ethno-religious conflicts of the Post-
Soviet regions. 
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1—Islam is not the root cause of the conflict, it 
is a main factor in its continuation and its main 
ideological tenant.  [Thus, a “clash of 
civilizations” is deemed more appropriate vice a 
“clash of religious opponents.]  2—Islam is a 
cover for very secular pragmatic objectives in 
the economic and political sphere and that the 
religious renaissance is merely a convenient tool 
for attaining separatist ends.95 
However, both the first and second approaches equate Islam 
with militant fundamentalism and imply Islam’s hostility to 
Russia.  Additional approaches are as follows: 
3—As a religion, Islam should not be involved in 
political squabbles and can be useful only as a 
peace-keeping force in conflict situations.  
Lastly,  4—The Islamic factor must play a 
positive role in the creation of a new Russia.96 
 
Although the last approach is ambitious, the “… roots of 
Islamic radicalism are [not] likely to be eradicated.”97 
As the revival of Radical Islam has led the way to a 
new “social niche”, Kappler points out “three important 
areas” regarding the consequences of Islamic revival. 
By mid-1978 Moscow leaders were confronted by a 
completely new Islamic situation….  First, [a 
growing self-confidence and] … the espousal of 
‘socialist-Islamic’ principles… to detach 
socialism from its materialistic nineteenth-
century origins and to attribute it to much older 
ones—to Islam itself… [making Islam]… [free] of 
the “taint” with which it was imbued by religious 
criticism and atheist propaganda.  Secondly, [an] 
increasing sense among Muslim… people that their 
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culture is distinct from Russian/European 
culture.  [And the] …third area concerns the 
growing political self-assurance of the Islamic… 
people… that their unique history is not confined 
to the past… but continues through the present.98 
2. The Role of the Russian State 
The weakness of the Russian state has a significant 
influence on religious and ethnic violence.    As the state 
is expected to provide security, this good has not been felt 
within the Chechen community (i.e., during the “Chechen 
Conflicts” of the mid-1990’s).  In addition, information 
failures combined with problems of credible commitments 
(from “Mother Russia”) resulted in serious security dilemmas 
for members of the Chechen minority group.  Nonetheless, in 
the midst of being assaulted in the Republic of Chechnya by 
their fellow Russian countrymen, the Chechens managed to 
fight back and appear to have made their place among the 
aggrieved and armed ethnic groups of the 21st century. 
As a result, the Muslim Revival has become an 
opportunity to revive the ethnic and national awareness 
within the Russian Federation (i.e., the North Caucasus 
region).  Incidentally, 
… [l]iberalization under Gorbachev, after the mid 
1980’s altered [the] religious contexts [of the 
Islamic revival].99 
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As part of the growing ethnic and national awareness 
featured in his reforms, the North Caucasus was allowed to 
reassert their ethnic and national identity.  In the end, 
Gorbachev’s Reforms contributed to the following: 
1—The removal of restrictions on the expression 
of religious feelings and engaging in religious 
activities.  2—The removal of barriers to 
increased contacts between Soviet Muslims and the 
rest of the Islamic world.  [And] 3—The increased 
flow of funds and Islamic missionaries.100 
D. POST-SOVIET FEARS OF RADICAL ISLAM 
There is a sense of growing destabilization within the 
Russian Federation (and the international community) due to 
the emergence of Radical Islam.  Terrorist activities within 
the Russian Federation are ongoing examples of the growing 
destabilization.  Such activities within Dagestan have made 
it the leader in terrorist activities—surpassing Chechnya in 
2005.101  With the death of Islamic Fundamentalist Shamil’ 
Basayev in July of 2006, the question arose: “Will the 
radical extremists be able to continue their campaign of 
terror and violence without [him]?102  The answer is found 
in the fact that radical Islam is considered to be a “multi-
layered [and regenerative] organization which has been 
constructed and developed over 10 years of war”.103  It is 
an element of society that is expected to continue on, even 
after the death of its infamous leaders. 
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Another example of the destabilizing effects of this 
“radical religion” is the emergence of radicalized women.104  
As the Chechen wars have “profoundly changed the role of 
women in Chechnya… [they] comprise a shocking majority (68%) 
of Chechen suicide bombers.” 105  As the attacks are 
“directly proportional to cycles of violence against 
civilians in Chechnya”, female suicide bombers have taken on 
new roles in the evolution of Russian cleansing 
operations.”106  These “strategic tactics” primarily “target 
military installations and government compounds.107 
The “deadly debut” of Chechen female suicide bombers 
was initiated by Khava Barayeva.  In 2000, she became the 
first female suicide bomber—killing 27 Russian Special 
Forces in Chechnya.  As some seek “virgin purity” in the 
afterlife, the motivations of many female suicide bombers 
include: financial gains for their family and/or revenge for 
the death of a loved one. 108 
In July of 2003 three “Black Widows” (linked to Chechen 
rebels) were involved in two separate incidents in Moscow—
killing 15 people.  In October of 2006, a siege took place  
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at the Nord-Ost Dubrovka Theater in Moscow.  In this case, 
19 women were hostage takers—killing 129 civilians; 41 
militants were killed.109 
E. THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM REVIVAL IN RUSSIA 
In 2006, Russia's Muslim population had increased by 40 
percent to about 25 million self-identified Muslims. Russian 
expert, Paul Goble also reported between 2.5 and 3 million 
Muslims living in Moscow.   Most of these residents migrated 
from the North Caucasus region.  This resulted in giving 
Moscow the largest Muslim population of any European 
city.110 
Data also shows that the number of mosques in Russia 
has grown from 300 in 1991 to more than 8,000 today.  Paul 
Goble has also predicted a “Muslim majority… within our 
lifetime", within Russia.  However, “… [Islamic] changes 
have been accompanied by a “rising tide” of anti-Muslim 
prejudice.”111  Public-opinion surveys  
reveal that up to “70% of ethnic Russians” express sympathy 
with xenophobic slogans.  Nonetheless, Goble has predicted 
that “… the rise of this majority will have a profound 
effect on the country's foreign policy.112 
Consequentially, Islamic Fundamentalism continues to be 
a major presence and political force in the Post-Soviet Era.  
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There appears to be a common link between the revival of 
Islamic Fundamentalism and a surge in ethnic and national 
awareness within the North Caucasus region.  It also appears 
to be—the limits for Islamic Fundamentalists (heeding the 
cause for social justice and fair government reform) are 
endless.  As a result, separatist and radical movements have 
energized Islamic Fundamentalists throughout the Russian 
Federation (i.e., the North Caucasus region).   Hence, 
because radical Muslims are operating in a post communist 
society—the significance of religious identity in the Post-
Soviet Era is increasing. 
Domestically and internationally, the religious aspects 
of ethnic conflicts between ethnic Russians and members of 
the surrounding Russian Republics are of considerable 
importance.  Because the collapse of communism has left 
opportunities for demanding social justice, Islamic 
Fundamentalism has become a part of the current ethno-
religious situation which continues to promote ethnic 
federalism between Russia and its surrounding constituent 
republics.  Furthermore, as this situation has continued to 
evolve, Islamic Fundamentalism has come to overshadow 
previous social issues such as: ethnic identity; the Russian 
search for nationalism; and self-determination on behalf of 
the Russian Republics.  And due to the growing insurgency 
found within the Northern Caucasus region, there is now a 
growing sense of destabilization being felt throughout the 
Russian Federation. 
As Stefan Wolff writes: “… conflicts are rooted in the 
perception of threats and the policies formulated to counter 
 47
them….”113  Thus, in order to deal with ethnic and religious 
conflict in the long term, the Russian and Chechen 
governments must either reduce ethnicity’s (and religion’s) 
salience or acknowledge that ethnicity is an enduring 
feature within society.  Once that decision is made, a set 
of approaches for achieving durable peace opens up.  Through 
the use of socio-psychological methods, both communities can 
promote the proper confidence building measures that will 
encourage a more peaceful coexistence.  On the other hand, 
another focus could be allowing for the institutional 
structural perspectives to shape individual and group 
behavior while regulating relations between communities.  
The immediate goal is to manage conflict.  The ultimate goal 
is to settle it. 
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The ethnic Russian search for a cohesive national 
identity continues to adversely affect its relations with 
neighboring countries (i.e., members of its former Russian 
Republics).  As historical hatreds continue to fuel the 
ethnic and religious conflicts between Mother Russia and the 
North Caucasus region of Chechnya, religious identity in its 
violent 21st century guise is becoming more of a threat than 
the preservation of ethnic identity.  More specific to the 
Russian-Chechen conflict is the fact that even as Russian 
Federal forces (in 2006) were able to stem major military 
resistance in Chechnya, “… managing to kill many of the 
remaining top Chechen rebel military and political leaders—
the violence continues.”114 
As the spread of Islamic Fundamentalism makes its way 
across the Post-Soviet Regions, international concerns are 
growing among Russia’s neighbors, certain of whom have 
already integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures and among 
those that aspire still to do so.  Even though it is 
intended to be a doctrine of peace, many individuals (and 
countries) have chosen to categorize Islamic Fundamentalism 
as a form of global terrorism.  Thus, while only the Western 
media may point out the religious and ethnic elements of the 
domestic conflicts within Russia, the conflicts will 
continue to be a manifestation of the motivations of the 
political and local elites within the Russian and Chechen 
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society.  As a result, the ethnic and non-ethnic Russian 
perspectives on Russian ethnic identity, Russian 
nationalism, and radical religious movements (i.e., Islamic 
Fundamentalism) will continue to have a dark cloud over 
them. 
As Post-Soviet ethnic and religious conflicts continue 
to influence U.S.-Russian relations, expert in Post-Soviet 
Affairs, Michael McFaul states, 
… integration with the West is no longer a goal 
of Russian foreign policy.  [In fact] … American 
weakness is driving Russian assertiveness.”115 
Thus, the perception of Russia as a “superpower” has significant 
influence upon U.S. policy in Europe and Eurasia.116  As 
international socialism is linked to international economics, 
American policy makers must continue to seek a connection with 
its previous foe of the Cold War; even though Americans may feel 
its territories harbor breeding grounds for global terrorists.  
And as conflicts such as the “Chechen Wars” have revived cultural 
and political interests within the North Caucasus region of 
Chechnya.  As Russia is the only country in the world with more 
natural resources than the United States, including vast oil and 
gas reserves; U.S. interests in maintaining its global dominance 
are connected to its ability to “control” this region of the 
world—if not only from afar.117 
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Furthermore, American leadership will continue in its 
pursuit of an all inclusive counterterrorism policy to 
combat global terrorism while also attempting to subdue the 
growing power of its number one economic (i.e., oil and gas) 
competitor.  By “taking the lead” in combating terrorism (be 
it driven by cultural or religious fanatics), America will 
continue to preserve its existence as the more dominant and 
influential global superpower.  As globalization is about 
destruction and creation, the ultimate goal—for America—is 
to have other countries (i.e., Russia) fall in line with 
U.S. domestic and foreign policy. 
While Islamic Fundamentalism and recognition of ethnic 
identity in Post-Soviet regions have awakened a new sense of 
Russian statecraft and nationalism, religion stands to be 
(historically) the dominant force of controversy for 
starting a war.  Beliefs, desires and mis-understandings 
will drive individuals to take drastic measures to ensure 
the continued existence of the individual, the state, and 
ultimately the nation.  Thus, ethnic and religious conflict 
will continue to be consequences of the “basic human 
preferences for individual or group survival”.  
It is the survival of the Post-Soviet nation (as a whole) 
which rests with the “fitness and adaptation” of the cultures at 
hand (inclusive of their various religions and beliefs).  This 
leaves the “micro-evolutionary questions about timing, escalation 
and duration of ethnic (and religious) violence” to be answered 
in accordance with the constructs and confines of the macro and 
intermediate elements of evolutionary theory.  Until the actors 
involved seek to peacefully permeate set barriers, unresolved 
ethnic conflict and religious revival (i.e., Islamic  
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Fundamentalism) will continue to dominate the domestic affairs of 
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